North America

Autonomous Cars, Semi-Autonomous Cars, and Toronto’s Railways to Nowhere

The City of Toronto has two “railways to nowhere”: the Sheppard subway and the Richmond Hill GO train.

The Sheppard Subway 

The Sheppard subway is 5.5 km long, has five stations, and connects to only one other rail line, the Yonge line. By comparison, the Yonge-University subway will soon be 38.8 km long (when the Vaughn extension begins operation), will have 38 stations, and will connect to many other rail lines, including the Bloor-Danforth subway, the Sheppard subway, 7 GO train lines (all at Union), and eventually also the Eglinton Crosstown.

The Bloor-Danforth subway is 26.2 km long, has 31 stations, and has connections with other rail lines at stations like Dundas West (the Union-Pearson Express train and the Kitchener GO train), Main Street (the Stoufville GO train and Lakeshore East GO train) and Kennedy (the Scarborough RT*, Stoufville GO train, Eglinton, and, if the City’s current transit plans are realized, the Scarborough subway tunnel).

TTC ridership.png

The Richmond Hill GO Train

Before the start of this year, the Richmond Hill GO train line was 34 km long and had five stations, three of which were located within the City of Toronto. With an extension to a new station, Gormley Station, having been opened in 2017, the line is now 42 km long, with six stations—but still only three in the City of Toronto. In contrast, the other six GO lines are between 50-103 km long (for an average of 69.6), have between 9-13 stations (for an average of 11.2), and have between 2-6 stations within Toronto (an average of 4).

go train ridership.png

Read more: Toronto Crow’s Advantage   (…apologies for some of the pictures being blurry and links being broken, I’ll try to fix them soon)

North America

Robots & Ontario’s Minimum Wage

Economists have long tried to identify “goldilocks wages”: ideal compromises in the tradeoff between higher minimum wages and higher rates of un(der)employment. This is, of course, far more than merely a theoretical pursuit. With an election coming up in Ontario next year, it is also one of the main issues likely to spill over from economics into politics. The province plans on raising its minimum wage, from $11.40 today to $14 in 2018 and $15 in 2019. Inevitably, this has raised questions as to whether or not it will lead to more jobs being outsourced or automated, if employers decide they cannot afford to pay the higher wages.

Thus far, most of the minimum wage studies that have been conducted have tended to ask questions such as:

  • How many jobs within the jurisdiction that is planning on raising its minimum wage are susceptible to outsourcing or automation?
  • How many workers within the jurisdiction that is planning on raising its minimum wage earn less than what the minimum wage will become?
  • How does the planned minimum wage compare to that of other nearby jurisdictions?
  • How migration-elastic are the jurisdiction’s labour markets (in other words, how likely is there to be an exodus of workers to other jurisdictions, if domestic minimum wages are not raised)?

One of the complicating factors these studies generally reveal is that conditions vary from place to place even within the same jurisdiction. In Ontario, for instance, there are obvious differences between Toronto and most of the other smaller cities and towns in the province. A smaller share of Toronto’s labour force earns less than $14 dollars per hour. A smaller share of Toronto’s labour force may have jobs susceptible to automation. Toronto’s labour force might also be more migration-elastic, given that the population of Toronto is relatively young. Young workers may be somewhat more willing to move to faraway markets like Western Canada or foreign markets like the US (or, linguistically, Quebec) if wages at home are too low.

The Night Moves 

There are many other variables that one could analyze as well when attempting to determine whether a given minimum wage is suitable. Due to current technological trends, two in particular may be worth discussing:

— the disparity between an economy’s manual labour costs and energy prices
— the disparity between an economy’s daytime energy prices and overnight energy prices

The former variable will help decide how likely an economy is to employ sophisticated machines—robots—to substitute for human labour. Robots tend to be energy-intensive, so an economy in which energy is cheap but labour is expensive will, generally speaking, be ripe for roboticization. Arguably, an example of such an economy is Quebec. Its manual labour costs are high because its population is older than the Canadian average, and much older than the US or global averages. Yet its electricity prices are among the lowest in North America. Ontario’s other neighbour, Manitoba, also has some of the cheapest electricity in North America.

The latter variable has the same implications. Because robots which replace manual labour generally consume a lot of energy, and because one of the main advantages of robots relative to human workers is that machines do not need to rest or sleep overnight, an economy in which the cost of energy overnight is cheap compared to the cost of daytime energy might be one in which roboticization will be likelier to occur.

Obviously this conversation remains a speculative one at the moment, since widespread roboticization has not yet occured. Still, it may be important to have it anyway, as it appears to have a special relevance for Ontario:

1) Energy/Labour

Ontario’s energy prices are very high by Canadian standards. They are more than double those of Quebec and Manitoba, for example. Yet Ontario’s energy remains roughly middle-of-the-pack when compared to prices in US states, and is even extremely cheap when compared to many wealthy countries in Europe and East Asia. Electricity in Ontario is only about half as expensive as in Europe’s largest economy, Germany. These lower energy costs, when combined with Canada’s relatively high labour costs, is why some have predicted that Canadian firms will experience among the highest savings from roboticization (see graph below).

For Ontario, there is therefore a risk that jobs will be lost not merely to robots working within Ontario, but also to those working within other nearby Canadian markets where energy prices are far lower than in Ontario.

Labour Cost Savings

Source: Boston Consulting Group 

2) Daytime/Overnight

While Canada in general has a high disparity between energy costs (which are relatively cheap) and labour costs (which are relatively expensive), it is Ontario in particular that has a high disparity between daytime energy costs (which are relatively expensive) and overnight energy costs (which are relatively cheap). This is because Ontario is a world leader in nuclear power generation (see graph below). Nuclear power plants, unlike natural gas or hydroelectric plants, cannot be shut off at night without wasting fuel. Ontario has such a large surplus of overnight electricity that it often has to pay its producers to turn off their power plants at night, and often sells overnight power at prices that are well below the cost of production.

Nuclear Generation

Source: US Energy Information Administration 

At the moment, this is not a situation that is unique to Ontario. Like nuclear plants, coal power plants also cannot easily be shut off at night. Economies which rely on coal therefore often have surplus overnight power as well. In recent years, however, there has begun a major shift from coal-based power to gas or renewables. The Dow Jones U.S. Coal Index has lost more than 95 percent of its value since 2011, for example.

As economies rely less on coal and more on gas plants (which can be shut off at night) and solar power (which cannot help but be shut off at night), nuclear economies like Ontario are becoming far more unique in their disparity between daytime and overnight energy prices. This is true also of Ontario’s wider region: in the US, the two largest nuclear producers by far are Pennsylvania and Illinois, both fellow Great Lake states. Ontario’s immediate neighbours, New York and Michigan, are the fourth and tenth largest producers, respectively.

Moreover, because of its geographic size, Ontario is a burgeoning player in the wind-power industry. Yet  because of its geographic location, Ontario does not produce much solar power. Wind turbines cannot be shut off overnight either without wasting “fuel” (i.e. without wasting wind), whereas solar plants only produce power in the daytime. This too is driving Ontario’s disparity between its daytime and overnight costs.

Because humans rest at night, but robots do not have to, the disparity between an economy’s daytime and overnight power costs could become a major determinant in the susceptibility of its labour force to automation.


These inquiries into the question of roboticization, though preliminary (and perhaps still quite premature), suggest that Ontario should be especially careful when carrying out minimum wage increases. Given the disparity between daytime and overnight energy costs in Ontario, as well as the disparity between energy and labour costs within Canada in general, it may be that employment in the region will face a high level of competition from robots. If Ontario wants to improve the standard of living of its minimum wage workers, it might be wiser to pursue alternative policies, such as reducing income taxes on its lowest tax brackets.

North America

The Father, the Son, and the Holy Mackinaw-what-a-comeback-for-the-Liberals!


Let’s talk, very quickly, about Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Justin Trudeau, and the resurrection  the Liberal Party in Canada underwent during the country’s most recent election, 20 months ago.

Before Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister at the end of 2015, the Liberals controlled only 34 of the 308 seats in Parliament. They had become the third party for the first time in their history. They had not won a majority of seats in Quebec for nine consecutive elections–not since Pierre Elliott Trudeau won big in Quebec in 1980.

Today, on the other hand, the Liberals have the largest majority in parliament that any party has won since the election of 1984 (the same year that Pierre left office), and they control a majority of Quebec’s seats to boot.

If you look at the electoral map from Justin Trudeau’s first victory in 2015, and the map of Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s final victory in 1980, you will see that the similarities between the two elections may or may not stand out more than their differences.


canada 1980 election

In both elections there was a clear East-West divide. The Liberals fared far better to the east of the Ontario-Manitoba border than they did to its west, regardless of which Trudeau was on the ticket. Both won flat-out majorities in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, and both won a significant majority of seats throughout the country as a whole.

Justin Trudeau, however, fared far better than his father in the Maritime provinces (he swept all 32 ridings, whereas his father lost in Nova Scotia), worse in Quebec (he won 51 percent of Quebec’s seats; Pierre won 99 percent), and better in Ontario (66% vs 55%), Manitoba (50% vs 14%), Saskatchewan (8% vs 0), Alberta (12% vs 0), and British Columbia (40% vs 0). Further north, Justin swept the Territories’ three ridings; his father lost all three.

Two other important differences between 2015 and 1980 were the price of fossil fuels and the strength of the North American economy. In 1980 the price of oil was over 100$ per barrel when adjusted for inflation; during Justin Trudeau’s victory in 2015 oil was only at 40$ a barrel, having dropped by 60$ in the fifteen months leading up to election day. And while the economy of the United States was in relatively decent health in 2015, in 1980 it was still in the midst of “stagflation“, with negative GDP growth and an unemployment rate around 6-7%.

Canada oil and gas production

Source: RBC, predictions from March 2015

With decent US economic growth decent and oil prices falling substantially, Ontario and British Columbia appear to have grown the most among provincial economies in 2015; Alberta’s and Newfoundland’s may barely have grown at all.

can-us 50 land:water

For more about the graph above, see Ontario: the Borderland Economy






I’ll close here by showing a graph I made which I think is interesting, but which probably (definitely) should be taken with a very large grain of salt. The graph shows a relationship between four variables: the price of crude oil (in West Texas Intermediate prices, adjusted for inflation); the employment rate in the United States (which we are using as a proxy for American economic health in general); the success of Conservative parties* and the NDP in Canadian federal elections; and the success of the Liberals and Bloc Quebecois in elections. The basic idea is that because western Canada benefits from expensive oil whereas eastern Canada depends more on a strong American economy, and because Conservatives and the NDP are generally more associated with western Canada whereas the Liberals and Bloc are associated with the eastern half of Canada, there should, maybebe some links between these variables:

Canada Politics Graph

Conservative parties include the Progressive Conservative, Canadian Alliance, Reform, or, since 2003, the Conservative Party. The Bloc Quebecois, meanwhile, was founded in 1991

This graph covers the same time period, from Pierre Trudeau’s final election in 1980 to Justin Trudeau’s first election in 2015. It shows that in the elections immediately following Pierre’s departure and immediately preceding Justin’s arrival – namely, in the elections of 1984 and 2011 – the Conservatives and/or NDP did extremely well relative to the Liberals and/or Bloc Quebecois. In 2011 Harper won his only majority government and the NDP become the official opposition for the first time ever, while in 1984 Pierre Trudeau resigned prior to the election and Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives won by the largest margin in Canadian history.

Every year shown on the graph above corresponds with a Canadian federal election, with the exception of 1998. 1998, however, was the year in which oil prices fell to their lowest point in nearly a century, even as the American economy was not in a recession, as it usually is when oil prices fall. With US employment high and oil prices low, the blue line on the graph above is far higher than in any other year. In the subsequent election, in 2000, Jean Chretien would go on to win a large majority for the Liberals, and the BQ a majority of ridings in Quebec. 2000 was the last time that any party won a majority government until 2011, and the last time the Liberals won a majority until 2015.

For more on this subject, check out Trudeau Walks A Tightrope, published on MacroGeo earlier this week.

Africa, Europe, Middle East

The Day After Tomorrow, in Morocco


Amid the election victory of the intensely pro-coal, global warming denier Donald Trump, the UN’s annual Climate Change Conference is underway in Marrakech, Morocco, and is aiming to build on last year’s Paris Agreement. The conference began on November 7 and will run until the 18th.

Trump aside, getting any far-reaching climate deal done will be a herculean challenge involving unprecedented cooperation and goodwill between nations. Specifically, it will require cooperation between developed economies, which account for most greenhouse gas emissions in per capita as well as historical terms, and developing ones, which have the most urgent need for an increase in carbon emissions and carbohydrates consumption. Morocco, which is a developing, African, Muslim economy that shares the pillars of Hercules with its developed, European, Christian neighbour Spain, could therefore be among the most fitting places to accomplish such an effort.

Morocco exemplifies many of the greatest challenges as well as greatest opportunities of a world in which the use of fossil fuels is relegated to the back-burner. Using Morocco as a case study, one can explore in detail what the Day After Tomorrow could look like. Not the apocalyptic version of climate change that Hollywood has repeatedly shown us, but rather a more hopeful Day After Tomorrow: the lower-pollution world those at the conference in Marrakech are hoping to build.

On the challenge side of the ledger, Morocco is one of the poorer countries of the Arab world, and, while not an energy exporter itself, it does rely on business with and investment from the oil-rich Gulf. Moreover it is one of the largest food importers in the world (relative to GDP size), and is part of both the Arab and Saharan worlds which are similarly beholden to food imports. Given the energy-food-water nexus, which has many aspects, there is a far-reaching link between food and fuel prices. In any climate deal, countries like Morocco and regions like the Middle East must be supported in one way or another if they are to avoid economic crises due to food-price inflation and declining energy export revenues.

There is also a geopolitical and humanitarian component to this. Conflicts can be started in response to food prices: the current Syrian war may have been sparked or at least exacerbated by drought. Morocco has its own dormant food-related conflict with its gas-rich neighbour Algeria over Western Sahara, the large Moroccan-controlled former Spanish colony which holds perhaps three-quarters of global reserves of phosphate fertilizer.

In terms of opportunities in a lower-emissions world, Morocco has three factors working in its favour. First, its location at the exact crossroads of the Atlantic and Mediterranean puts it in a strong position to engage in fuel-efficient maritime trade with large markets like Europe, the Americas, and South Asia. Second, Morocco has renewable energy to harness: the Saharan sun, seaside wind (Morocco’s coast is over 1800 km long), and direct electricity-grid linkages via Spain to the hefty renewables output of Europe. Indeed, Morocco built the largest solar plant in the world this year, while Spain is the world’s fourth largest producer of wind power and tenth largest of ‘renewables’ in general. Beyond Spain, Morroco’s largest trading partner France is by far the least dependent on fossil fuels of any of the world’s biggest economies. Finally, Morocco is one of the few countries to speak three global languages pretty well: Arabic, French, and Spanish. As such it is well-placed to engage in emissions-free trading of services and media on the Internet. Morroco’s even getting decent at English now, because of tourists from the UK, US, and EU.

Morocco has, indeed, always been something of an outlier. Today, it is arguably the only country in the Middle East or North Africa that is not or does not border a failed or semi-failed state. In recent years Morocco has been one of the few places in the region where good news has not been too difficult to come by. And with Trump’s victory last night, and the end of the climate conference approaching next week, we could all use some more good news out of Morocco right now.

East Asia, Images

Labour Strikes in China

The China Labour Bulletin website provides maps displaying incidents of labour strikes that have occurred in recent years. While of course these should be viewed with a hefty grain of salt, they may be worth scrutinizing all the same.

This image below shows the number of strikes in general that have occurred since 2011: as you can see, they have been becoming a lot more common since the beginning of 2014.

since 2011 map

Yet this may be somewhat misleading: nearly half of the strikes indicated in the map above are thought to have had fewer than 100 people participate in them. It may be better to look just at the number of larger strikes that have occured, as the following two maps do:

1000-10,000, 2011.png

more than 10,000 persons since 2011

4 out of the 7 labour strikes involving 10,000+ people since 2011 occured in Guangdong province, according to the China Labour Bulletin

These maps above show that the larger strikes, with 1000-10,000 people and 10,000+ people, respectively, occured most often in 2014, unlike the smaller but more numerous strikes that occured most frequently in 2015 and so far in 2016. Since 2015 there have not been any strikes involving more than 10,000 people, according to the China Labour Bulletin.


Now let’s have a closer look at the differences between China’s many provinces. Below I have tried to graph the number of strikes that have occurred in each province, first since 2011 and then since 2015:


2015Guangdong, China’s most populous province, finished at the top of both graphs, while Tibet, Qinghai, Hainan, Tianjin, Ningxia, Gansu, and Xinjiang finished at the bottom of both graphs. All of the provinces of China are more or less in the same position in both graphs, in fact. And there are no major regional patterns that can be gleaned clearly from either list.

1000 - 10,000 since 2015.png

Labour strikes since January 1, 2015 involving at least one thousand people. Guangdong had 27, followed by Jiangsu with 9 and Shandong with 8.

What if we adjust the figures to take into account the population size and GDP of each province?  Then we get the following graphs:

2011 pop

2011 gdp

Here Guangdong and Tibet again finished at the top and bottom of both graphs, respectively. Ningxia, however, which had finished fifth from the bottom before adjusting for population and GDP, has now moved up to second from the top. Ningxia is China’s third least populous province (the two Tibetan provinces, Tibet and Qinghai, are the least populous), is one of China’s five “autonomous regions” (the others are Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi), and, along with Xinjiang, has by far the highest concentration of Muslim inhabitants of any province in the country.

In the adjusted-for-population graph, China’s relatively small and wealthy “direct-controlled municipalities”, namely Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Chongqing, were much higher up than they were on the adjusted-for-GDP graph, with the exception of  Chongqing. (Chongqing is quite a bit less urbanized than the three others are). Shanghai and Beijing were third and fifth, respectively, while Tianjin, which was the least strike-prone of any province when adjusted-for-GDP, was close to the middle of the pack when adjusted-for-population.

Another big change was Hainan, China’s southernmost province and only island province (not counting Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan), which was third from the bottom before adjusting for population size or GDP, but fourth from the top when adjusting for GDP and eighth when adjusting for population size. Shanxi and Shaanxi, meanwhile, two neighbouring provinces located in and around the mountains of north-central China, moved from around the middle of the pack to near the top once adjusted for GDP and population.


Shanxi in particular is China’s major coal producing region, and the coal industry has come under a lot of pressure in recent years, which may help explain Shanxi’s high position on both of these graphs. (Shaanxi too is a top coal producer. Inner Mongolia, though, China’s second biggest coal producer, is admittedly near the bottom of the GDP-adjusted labour strikes graph). Shanxi has also been arguably the main provincial target by far of Xi Jinping’s intense “anti-corruption” campaign.

Still, these graphs again do not prioritize large strikes over smaller ones. Below, then, are the strikes with between 1000 – 10,000 participants that have occured since 2011. Since there have been very few strikes with more than 10,000 participants, the 1000-10,000 category accounts for an overwhelming share of the large labour strikes that have taken place:

1000 since 2011

1000 since 2011:pop

1000 since 2011:gdp

The graph showing labour strikes with more than 1000 people since 2011, adjusted for GDP size, is I suspect the most important one. The population-adjusted graphs tend to somewhat misleadingly overemphasize the wealthiest provinces, like Shanghai or Tianjin, since they have lots of per capita economic activity and therefore also lots of per capita labour strikes. The graphs that are not adjusted at all skew in favour of populous provinces, meanwhile. The GDP-adjusted graphs, though, are perhaps the most indicative of provinces in which there may be growing social challenges to China’s political or economic establishment.

Notably, this GDP-adjusted graph is also the only one in which clear regional divisions can be seen. Apart from Guizhou, nine of the ten westernmost provinces in China- Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Yunnan,  Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Gansu – are in the bottom thirteen provinces of the list, and six are also in the bottom seven of the list. Seven of the top nine provinces on the list, meanwhile, are seven of China’s eleven eastern coastal states. These also happen to be the seven most southern coastal states on the Chinese mainland.

Beijing and the provinces around Beijing, like Liaoning, Hebei, Henan, Tianjin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong, are near the bottom or the middle of the list. Shanghai on the other hand, as well as two of the three provinces that surround Shanghai, namely Jiangsu and Anhui, are quite close to the top of the list. Guangdong, which is the most populous province in China, remains far ahead at the top of the list. Three of Guangdong’s four neighbouring provinces, namely Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Fujian, are at the top of the list as well.


Remarkably, Guangdong’s GDP-adjusted figure for large labour strikes is roughly twice as high as any other province and five times the nationwide average. Guangdong has also been home to four of the seven labour strikes in China involving more than 10,000 people since 2011, according to the China Labour Bulletin. Given Guangdong’s enormous size and revolutionary history, this may be worth noting.


The other biggest outlier is the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, which apart from Guangdong had by far the most large strikes adjusted for GDP size. Heilongjiang has been a major oil and coal producing province, which may partially help to explain this. Strikes in the province have been putting its governor Lu Hao, the youngest provincial governor in the country, under a lot of political pressure of late.

Heilongjiang’s position also highlights an interesting trend: China’s most peripheral provinces, like Tibet, Guangdong, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Yunnan, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Hainan, and Jiangxi, are either at the very top of the list or at the very bottom of the list. Heilongjiang itself has the longest international border in China outside of the three “autonomous regions” of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Heilongjiang’s border with Russia is only slightly shorter than the entire US-Mexican border. Hopefully Donald Trump will move there once he loses the election this year,  and trouble America no more.

The China Labour Bulletin maps also zoom in to show which cities the strikes occured in, and gives basic information about them. For example:


It also breaks down the strikes by the response they are thought to have received, in five categories: “police”, “arrest(s)”, “government mediation”, “negotiation”, or “other”. According to the site, “Guangdong also led the country in the number of police interventions in labour disputes, accounting for about 19 percent of the total 831 incidents in which police were deployed and 24 percent of the incidents in which arrests were made”.

“Worker protests accounted for 38 percent of all mass protests by Chinese citizens last year, according to statistics published on the well-respected Wickedonna blog.”

To close, here are the numbers of strikes of all sizes since the beginning of 2015, adjusted for provincial population size and provincial GDP size. Guangdong is finally not at the top of either:

2015 pop

2015 gdp

But if you look only at large strikes since 2015, then Guangdong is back on top:

1000 - 10,000 since 2015.png

Labour strikes since January 1, 2015 involving at least one thousand people. Guangdong had 27, followed by Jiangsu with 9, Shandong with 8, and Sichuan with 5. There have been no strikes with 10,000+ people since the beginning of 2015, according to the China Labour Bulletin

North America

The Eternal Question


…Should I buy a treadmill?

According to Statista, wholesale consumer treadmill sales in the United States have fluctuated around one billion dollars per year since 2007; they dropped to 800 million dollars in 2009 after the recession and have gradually risen back up since. There are some reasons, though, why treadmills — or, perhaps, stationary bikes, ellipticals, rowing machines?, etcetera — could still be the “next big thing”:

1. Headphones 

Treadmills, I don’t need to tell you, are loud. As you use them, people living in the same home or apartment as you are often annoyed by both their noise and their vibrations. If you use them while watching television, you will probably have to turn the volume on the tv way up, which will bother people around you even more. You may even be bothered by the loud noise yourself; indeed if you make a habit of going on the treadmill with the tv blaring at full volume, you may damage your ears in the long run.

Wireless headphones, then, could make treadmills much more appealing. And high-quality wireless headphones are for the first time going to be widely owned within the next few years — or months.

2. Netflix 

Sorry Wolf Blitzer, I don’t want to see your face ever again. From now when I am on the treadmill I am going to watch Netflix or last night’s Raptors or Warriors game (nobody tell me who won!). Hey, that actually makes exercising sound pretty good: it’s a great excuse for me to binge on tv.

3. Televisions

The year is 1995 and I am building an exercise room in my house. I decide to put a big tv in front of the treadmill, so I spend hundreds of dollars on a large television with a big behind, then a few hundred dollars more on a cabinet set to hold this voluptuous television. Wow, this is so expensive, and takes up too much space in this room! Maybe I should just wait until 2015, when I can get a 32 inch flatscreen LCD tv for less than $300 (down from $1600 in 2005) and mount it directly on the wall.

In fact, tv’s have now become so skinny that they can be attached directly to the exercise equipment. This could potentially allow people to move their exercise equipment outdoors in some cases, taking advantage of the space and fresh air in their backyards. Combined with wearing wireless headphones so as to not annoy one’s neighbours, this could make purchasing exercise equipment more reasonable.

4. Occulus!

Is virtual reality coming at last? Recently people have begun to believe that it is. If it does become advanced and widespread, then it may require a means to simulate movement in order to create a more dynamic virtual experience. Treadmills are an obvious candidate for such a simulation. Virtual reality may benefit from treadmills, therefore, and treadmills may benefit from virtual reality. Of course this might not actually end up happening, but it is worth speculating on nonetheless.

5. Fitbit 

Fitbit, the Apple Watch, Stepcounter apps, etcetera. Devices that let you know, in real time, what a lazy bum you really are could change the exercise industry in a big way. I know that I spend too much time sitting in front of a computer or television, and have been thinking about downloading a new app that has your phone alert you whenever you have been sitting down for more than an hour at a time. (I probably won’t download it, but I have been thinking about it!).

Many people have certainly been begining to use apps that show them how many “steps” they have taken every day, and in the spirit of self-competitive self-improvement have started to walk more in order to up their scores. This could, perhaps, lead to an increase in people purchasing treadmills.

 6. Millenials 

A large share of young people continue to live at home with their parents, or else on their own in small apartments or homes (often partially supported by their parents) where they do not have much space. As the large millenial population continues to age, however, they will depart from the nest, leaving behind bedrooms that can house exercise equipment. Some millennials will also be beginning to move into larger homes, where they may begin to buy equipment too. Or maybe not.

7. Real Estate

If you live in a 750 square ft. apartment space, then a typical high-quality treadmill will take up about 5 percent of your floor space. That’s no good; you will need more space in your home before thinking seriously about spending the $3000 or more that high-quality treadmills often cost. So, will indoor space in North America become cheaper?

It might, thanks to evolutions in transport (cheaper gasoline, hi-tech cars, Uber-style carpooling, driverless trucks, e-commerce with home delivery, etc.), communications (the modern Internet), and home construction (robots helping to build homes — it’s a scary thought, but get ready for it), which could make it easier for humans to spread out across cities, across suburbs, and across the countryside than ever before. E-commerce and e-commuting may also help bring home prices down by allowing some commercial real estate to be converted into residential.

8. Delivery

Good-quality exercise equipment tend to be among the more difficult-to-transport types of consumer goods. In most cases they are heavy, bulky, awkwardly shaped (and unable to fold up) and delicate. Getting them up a flight of stairs into a spare bedroom, or up many flights of stairs into an apartment building, can be a very difficult experience — and a costly one if you are employing delivery-men. If shipping and delivery-men become cheaper, then, it could be a boon to the industry, therefore.

Both, perhaps, can be expected. Delivery-men costs may fall as a result of the price of labour in general being squeezed by the double-whammy that is automation and outsourcing. Shipping costs, meanwhile, may fall because of cheap oil (if prices do not rise back up), falling labour prices leading to falling truck driver prices, innovations in trucking (smarter trucks, self-driving trucks, etc.), and the rise of the e-commerce and home-delivery industry (led, currently, by companies like Amazon).

If, moreover, self-driving trucks really do become commonplace, it could lead to much cheaper home delivery by allowing goods to be dropped off at local storage sites near the homes overnight while there is no road traffic, and then brought to the buyer’s home during the day.

9. Home Offices

Because of the Internet, in the years ahead many more people are likely to work from home, or from offices or coworking spaces close to home. This may free up time for people to go to the gym more often, lessening their need for things like treadmills. On the other hand, it may make people more likely to exercise at home, increasing their need for things like treadmills. Will it make people more likely to buy treadmills, on balance? I am not sure, but it is a possibility worth considering.

In addition, as home office spaces continue to shrink in size as a result of getting rid of fat desktop computers, printers, scanners, computer desks with pullout keyboards, and filing cabinets, and replacing them with more versatile laptops, tablets, and flatscreen desktops, there may be more space available in the home for treadmills.

10. Seasons 

In theory, treadmills should be seasonal goods: if you live in a place like Canada then you don’t really need one during the summer when you will probably prefer to exercise outdoors instead, and if you live in a place like southern California then you may only really need one during the summer when it is boiling outside. In practice, however, the high cost of shipping and delivering treadmills has prevented seasonal home rentals of treadmills, as has the fact that many people living in hot climates still do not have air conditioning and so do not want to work out indoors in the summer. 

The continued spread of air conditioning and the ability to more cheaply deliver treadmills, therefore, could perhaps lead to a situation where more people seasonally rent treadmills. In theory, at least, this could save people money as well as space in their homes. In fact, it may just be possible that long-distance shipping will eventually become cheap enough for a treadmill to become like the opposite of migratory bird, being used in a cold climate during the winter and then being shipped south to a hot climate for the summer.


On the other hand, there are reasons why such a treadmill “revolution” may not come to pass. But I am too lazy to discuss them right now; I think I will go for a long walk in front of Netflix instead.

North America

America’s Domestic Environmental Geopolitics

In an op-ed in the New York Times earlier this month, economist Paul Krugman asks the question: why have the Republicans moved so far to the right on the environment, going from the introduction of the Clean Air Act of 1970 during the Republican Nixon administration (which passed the Senate, as Krugman points out, “on a bipartisan vote of 73 to 0”), and from the relatively eco-friendly amending of the Clean Air Act during the Republican George Bush Sr. administration in 1990, to the climate change denying, regulation-opposed strands of today’s Republican Party?

Krugman provides a possible answer to his question, writing: “[climate change denying] ideology is only part of the story — or, more accurately, it’s a symptom of the underlying cause of the divide: rising inequality. The basic story of political polarization over the past few decades is that, as a wealthy minority has pulled away economically from the rest of the country, it has pulled one major party along with it. True, Democrats often cater to the interests of the 1 percent, but Republicans always do. Any policy that benefits lower- and middle-income Americans at the expense of the elite… will face bitter Republican opposition. And environmental protection is, in part, a class issue, even if we don’t usually think of it that way. Everyone breathes the same air, so the benefits of pollution control are more or less evenly spread across the population. But ownership of, say, stock in coal companies is concentrated in a few, wealthy hands. Even if the costs of pollution control are passed on in the form of higher prices, the rich are different from you and me. They spend a lot more money, and, therefore, bear a higher share of the costs.”

Income inequality may indeed be the most significant aspect of this story, as Krugman says. Yet there might be some other explanations to this question as well, ones that do not have to do with general shifts in income distribution or political ideology, but rather with specific changes that have occurred to the economic geography and voting patterns of the United States during recent decades. Here are 10 such additional guesses as to why American environmental politics have become more divisive today than they were in previous generations.

1) US Coal Production Moves West 

The United States has by far the largest coal reserves in the world, is by far the largest coal producer in the world apart from China , and was a larger coal producer than China as recently as the 1980s. As you can see from one of the graphs below, US coal production used to come from states located to the east of the Mississippi River (notably, from West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and to a lesser extent Ohio), but has since moved to states west of the Mississippi — mainly to Wyoming, a state which now accounts for almost 50 percent of all coal production in the United States. To a lesser extent, it has also moved to Montana (which borders Wyoming), North Dakota (which borders Montana), and Texas.

US coal production has moved, in other words, from a number of states that have historically tended to vote Democrat or are swing-states — three of which, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, are among the most populous states in the country, and therefore carry more weight in elections — to a single state, Wyoming, which has almost always voted Republican and has literally the smallest population of any state in the country (though, because of coal, Wyoming also has the second highest per capita income of any state). Coal-producing Montana and North Dakota also have been firmly Republican states for decades, and also have relatively tiny populations. The Democratic Party no longer has even close to as much of a political interest in the coal industry as it used to, therefore. Indeed, while states like Illinois and Pennsylvania continue to produce a decent amount of coal today, their economic growth over the past few decades has meant that the value of this coal production as a share of their state GDP’s has dropped by a significant amount.

In contrast, coal production does remain a critical component of the smaller Midwestern economies of Kentucky and especially West Virginia. It is not too surprising, then, that West Virginia and Kentucky have not voted for a Democratic president since 1996. While Kentucky was always something of a swing-state, West Virginia actually used to be a staunchly Democratic state back in the days when the Democrats’ interests were more closely aligned with coal production. West Virginia voted for the Democrats in every presidential election but one between 1956 and 2000; in fact, as recently as the 1980 election it was one of only four states in the entire country to vote for the Democrats.

Meanwhile, as the graphs below also show, coal production has moved from underground mining to surface mining (which tends to be much more environmentally intrusive than underground mining), from producing bituminous coal to producing sub-bituminous coal and lignite (which are much more environmentally inefficient to transport and burn than bituminous coal is), and from being labour-intensive to being far less labour-intensive (meaning that there are fewer coal labourers around who might be inclined to vote against environmental protection; this is probably also one of the reasons West Virginia votes for the Republicans nowadays).500px-Fig_7-2_Coal_ProductionWV_Employment_vs_Production


2) Texas and California Switch Parties 

Today it seems hard to imagine that Texas would ever vote for the Democrats, or that California would ever vote for the Republicans. But that it is how it used to be. Prior to Bill Clinton, no Democratic President had ever won an election without Texas. In the presidential elections of 1964, 1956, 1952, and 1948, Texas actually voted for the opposite party as most of the rest of “the South” voted for, and in every presidential election from 1952 until 1988, Texas voted for the same party as New York voted for. California, meanwhile, voted for the Republicans in every presidential election from 1968 until 1992 (there were fewer Latino-Americans, white liberals, and other minority groups over the age of 18 in California back then); in fact, the most recent non-Bush Republican presidents, Reagan and Nixon, both came from California.

As Texas has become firmly Republican and California firmly Democrat, environmental politics have become more politically polarized, since California consumes the third least energy per capita of any US state (and also understands the dangerous power of the environment, as its population faces significant drought, earthquake, flooding, and forest-fire threats), while Texas uses the sixth most energy per capita of any state, and exports by far the most energy in absolute terms of any state apart from Wyoming. Texas is the US’s largest oil producer by far, its largest natural gas producer by far, and its sixth largest coal producer.

3) Declining California and Florida Oil Production

Back when it was a Republican-leaning swing-state, California was one of the country’s leading oil-producing states (it is actually still the third largest oil producer in the US). Oil production used to account for a much larger share of the Californian economy than it does today; however, since the mid-1980s, California’s energy production has gone down and down (see graph below) while its GDP has gone up and up because of its leading role in sectors like technology, tourism, entertainment, and real estate. Though California did briefly look like it might become a major player in the US’s recent shale oil production boom, that no longer seems likely to occur.

Because California is now so crucial to the Democrats (not only in the electoral college, but also financially and in terms of media influence), the Democrats might have had an incentive to be less environmentalist if California’s economy still depended on oil production to the same extent that it used to. (As California’s population has grown so much, it now also faces greater environmental challenges, such as droughts, than it used to, which has also made it more afraid of climate change, and therefore more in favour of environmental protection). If California was still willing to vote Republican, meanwhile, the Republicans might have an incentive to be more environmentalist. California, after all, has 12 percent of the US population and 14 percent of US GDP, both much larger figures than any other US state has. Thus, economic changes and voting patterns in California have probably contributed somewhat to making US environmental politics more divisive.

A similar trend has also occurred in some other important states. Florida, for example, which in the past few decades has grown to become the third most populous state in the US, has seen oil production fall by an astounding 95  percent or so since its peak production in 1978. It too has become a Democrat-voting state more often than it used to, also because of demographic changes. The same is true of Illinois, New York, and a few other states that have not taken part in the “shale revolution” oil production surge of recent years.



florida oil production

New York Oil Production

4) Rising Energy Prices 

Prior to 2014, the past 15 years or so saw oil and coal prices rise by a very large amount. This rise had a polarizing political effect, since, for the states which produce the most energy per capita (virtually all of which are Republican or swing-states), such as Wyoming, North Dakota, Louisiana, Alaska, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Utah, and Arkansas, energy production became more profitable, while, for many of the states which do not have much energy production per capita (most of which are Democrat or swing states), such as New York, Florida, New Jersey, Minnesota, Michigan, or Massachusetts, it became increasingly worthwhile to improve energy efficiency and/or increase alternative energy production or natural gas consumption.

Energy efficiency has also been occurring as a longer-term trend in the US (see graph below); it accelerated in some states as a result of rising energy prices in the past decade, but had already started long before that in the country as a whole. Rising energy prices also caused economies like Western Europe and Japan to become more energy-efficient and committed to alternative energy production in recent years, providing an example for many Democrats to aspire to.

Consumpt vs GDP

5)  Rising “Unconventional” Oil Production 

Partly as a result of higher oil prices – not only in the 2000’s, but also in the late 1970’s (see graph below) – there has been a rise in oil production from non-traditional sources in North America, such as Alaska (though Alaskan production has since begun to decline), deep underwater in the Gulf of Mexico, and, more recently, in the Albertan oil/tar sands, in shale deposits in states like Texas and North Dakota, and, expected in the near future, deep underwater off the coast of Newfoundland. Talk of beginning to develop the potentially humongous Alaskan and Canadian underwater Arctic oil reserves also became common in recent years.Crude_oil_prices_since_1861

All of these newer oil sources, however, tend to be more environmentally intrusive than “conventional” onshore or shallower-water offshore production. Thus, supporters of this production (more often than not Republican, of course) have been forced to leave environmentalist ideals further and further behind. Similar trends have often been occurring on a global level as well, and not only in oil production, but in coal production too. And all of this has been occurring during a time when both annual and cumulative emissions of gasses like carbon dioxide and methane are already much higher than they were in past decades.



The graph below shows “proven” oil reserves, not current oil production. The recent spikes in Canada and Venezuela are from estimates about the proven reserves in oil/tar sands:



And finally, shale oil and shale gas:



6) Rising Commodity Prices 

Oil and coal prices were not the only ones to rise during the 2000s. In part because of rapid manufacturing, construction, and general economic growth in China (and other countries, to a lesser extent), there was also a rise in metal, food, fertilizer, and a number of other commodity prices (see graph below). Because bulk commodities are often highly energy-intensive to produce and to transport, and because mining and in some cases agricultural production also tend to be directly environmentally intrusive, the growth in commodity production that was brought about by rising commodity prices has been an issue of environmental significance as well.


Notably, as with oil and coal, the production of agricultural and mineral commodities within North America mostly takes place within Republican states or swing states, or else in the Canadian Prairies (in politically Conservative Canadian provinces that are just across the border from Republican states in the US). States like Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Arizona, Nevada, Missouri, Utah, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Idaho are significant producers of agricultural or mineral commodities, for instance, and they usually (or always) vote Republican.

Because the largest commodity reserves tend to be in the vast interior states which tend to have either fairly small or very small populations, these states also get a lot of money per capita for this commodity production, and rely on commodity production for a significant portion of their states’ economic output. And the US (and Canada) really does produce an enormous amount of these commodities; it is far and away the world’s largest food exporter, for instance, which is impressive considering that it is also the world’s third largest food consumer. So, the fact that these states have long tended to vote Republican means that rising commodity prices may have contributed to the Republican parties becoming relatively less eco-friendly compared to the Democrats.

There are only a few exceptions to this pattern. The largest of these are the neighbouring states of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. Wisconsin produces agricultural goods like corn and dairy products and almost always votes Democrat; Minnesota produces most of the US’s iron ore (the world’s most traded commodity aside from crude oil), yet has voted Democrat in every presidential election since 1972, and in fact was the only state in the entire country to vote against a second presidential term for Republican Ronald Reagan in 1984; and Iowa – an important state in US politics, because it holds the earliest caucus during the presidential primaries – has an economy that is highly dependent on corn production, yet has shed its Republican-leaning past by voting for the Democrats in five of the last six presidential elections (in part, perhaps, because a lot of its corn is used to create ethanol, a more eco-friendly substitute for gasoline. Also Iowa produces more wind power than any state other than Texas). But even Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were all among the top ten closest races in the 2012 election among states in which the Democrats won; their populations only gave about 6.5 percent more of their votes to Obama than to Romney.

Because of rising commodity prices, commodity extraction has been an issue of growing environmental significance on a global level as well, particularly within the developing world. This too may have also led to a growing divide between Democrat voters, who arguably tend to be more global-minded in their political outlook when it comes to non-military issues, and Republican voters, who arguably tend to be more nationalist or insular in their worldview.

7) Changing Electoral Demographics 

Demographic changes as a result of immigration and internal migration have changed the US electoral map over time, aiding the Democrats and, as a result, perhaps making them less in need of reaching out to energy and commodity producing corporations in swing states, or to the very rich or super-rich throughout the country, or to the states which depend the most on energy or commodity production (many of which tend to have relatively few non-white inhabitants, incidentally). As you can see from the graph below, the US immigration boom has increased steadily in recent decades, and took off in a big way around 1990. So, immigration to the US is to a certain degree actually a fairly recent phenomenon (ignoring the pre-WW1 immigration boom, which is practically ancient history at this point). In fact, most second-generation immigrants from the heart of the most recent boom are still just turning 18 around now. And even among those who have already turned 18, voting participation tends to rise with age.


We already discussed the flipping of California from swing state to Democrat state, which was, at least in part, the result of inward internal migration from other parts of the US and external immigration from Asia and of course from Latin America. More recently, immigration from Mexico has flipped the state of New Mexico, which voted for the Republicans in every presidential election from 1968 until 1992, but has now voted Democrat in every presidential election since (with the exception of 2004, when it voted for a second Bush term). In the 2000 election, in fact, New Mexico was surrounded by a virtual sea of red states (see map below), but still voted for the Democrats; it was the counterimage of New Hampshire in that election, which voted Republican but was utterly surrounded by blue states.

2000 US election map

Immigration from Latin America (plus internal migration of young liberals to the city of Denver) may also have led Colorado – the population of which is now 20-25 percent Hispanic – to go from voting for the Republicans in every presidential election but one from 1968 until 2008, to voting for Obama in both of his elections. A similar thing is probably true of Nevada (now 25-30 percent Hispanic, and with a huge amount of internal US migration to Nevada’s Las Vegas metropolitan area in the past decade), which has actually voted for the winning US president in every single election since after 1976 (most of which have been Republicans), and could be about to vote Democrat for the third election in a row in 2016.

Many Democrats also think it may just be on the verge of happening in Arizona as well (now 30-35 percent Hispanic, and with lots of people from across the US moving to Phoenix), which voted Republican in every single presidential election but one since 1948. In 1964, in fact, Arizona was the only Republican-voting state in the country outside of “the South” – see map below. While Arizona did not vote for Obama in either of his elections, it may be that it would have voted for Obama in 2008 had his opponent not been Arizona’s own John McCain. Arizona and Nevada both produce almost no fossil fuels.


Immigration may also help the Democrats win the eastern states of North Carolina and Virginia, the 9th and 12th most populous US states, respectively, neither of which produce much fossil fuels. The populations of North Carolina and Virginia are both now around 10 percent Hispanic (in other words, far less than some states, but far more than many other states). The population of Raleigh, North Carolina has also been swelled by a very large amount of internal migration from across the country during the last decade, as has the population of the metropolitan area of the city of Washington. D.C., which extends into Virginia. In fact, the cities of Charlotte, North Carolina and Raleigh, North Carolina have had the US’s two fastest-growing Hispanic populations since 2000, and Washington D.C. was not far behind them. North Carolina had not voted Democrat since 1976 and Virginia not since 1964, but both voted for Obama in 2008 and Virginia voted for Obama in 2012 as well.

Even more importantly, many Democrats think these same trends are now working to help them secure some of the country’s largest states, most notably Florida. Florida has historically tended to vote for the Republicans more often than the Democrats, but voted for Obama twice (and may technically have voted for Gore over Bush in the contested 2000 election which saw a Florida recount, even when the governor of Florida at the time was Bush’s own brother Jeb). Florida’s population is now around 25 percent Hispanic, and in particular has seen a large amount of growth in its non-Cuban Latin American population and among younger Cuban generations. This demographic shift is probably significant, given that the original Cuban generation that has been prominent in Florida’s politics in recent decades tended to be relatively conservative politically, reflecting the fact that in many cases it was made up of middle-class and upper-class Cubans who had to leave Cuba following the Communist Castro takeover there. Florida too produces very little fossil fuels.

Illinois, which in recent decades has been a swing state that has tended to vote for the Democrats, has perhaps seen its Democratic base strengthen as well because of demographic changes. It is now more than 15 percent Hispanic. New Jersey, the 11th most populous US state, is a Democrat state that used to vote often Republican prior to Bill Clinton (and which the Republicans probably hope to retake, which may be a part of the reason why they have been considering choosing the current Republican New Jersey governor Chris Christie as their candidate in 2016), and it now has a population that is approximately 20 percent Hispanic.

Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, the three largest conventional swing states in the US apart from Florida, have also had fast-growing Hispanic populations in the past decade or so, though their overall Hispanic populations remain only about 3.5 – 7.5 percent of their total populations. (Michigan also had fast-growing immigration from Iraq during the past decade). On the other hand, these states have also seen some outward internal US migration of young voters to other states.

Finally, even Georgia, a firmly Republican state which is the 8th most populous state in the country, could perhaps soon flip to the Democrats, the result of having a fast growing Hispanic population (the 10th fastest-growing of any state since 2000, which now accounts for more than 10 percent of the state’s total population), a large, long-established African-American population (roughly 20 percent of the state’s total population), and some young, potentially liberal families moving to Atlanta (which was one of the US’s fastest-growing metropolitan regions during the 2000s). Georgia also produces very little fossil fuels.

8) External US Geopolitics   

During the Cold War, most Americans saw the Soviet Union as a very real potential threat to their security. The Soviet economy was dependent on producing energy and other commodities, which meant that any energy or commodity production within the United States would significantly hurt the Soviet position. Indeed, it was probably not a coincidence that the Soviet Union collapsed during a period of low energy prices. And it was not only the Soviets that were dependent on high commodity prices: until around the 1990s, the Communist Chinese were net exporters of energy and commodities as well.

Today the US is no longer in a Cold War. In fact, some of the nations in the world that seem potentially the most capable of challenging American power over the medium-term, such as China, Japan, Germany, or India, would all benefit from low energy and commodity prices far more than the US would — while, conversely, close US allies like Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and even Britain are all significant energy or commodity producers, and so would actually be hurt by (or in Britain’s case, not benefit too much from) such lower prices.

As a result, the US has no real “strategic” geopolitical impetus to support rising domestic energy or commodity production in the way that it used to (though some Americans, particularly Republicans, have recently begun to support rising American oil production as a way to undermine the governments of countries like Russia and Iran). The collapse of the Communist Russian empire in 1990, therefore, combined with the transformation of Communist China from a net commodity and energy exporter to a gigantic commodity and energy importer, has perhaps been helping to cause more Americans (or at least, more Democrat politicians) to favour stronger domestic environmental protection.

9) Keystone XL and the Swinging Midwest

The defining feature of the American electoral system today is that, apart from Florida, every one of the largest US swing states are located in the Midwest (especially if you count Illinois as a swing state, as perhaps is appropriate to do). This may be a big part of the reason the incumbent Democratic party has embraced Pennsylvania’s enormous shale natural gas boom (see graph below), in spite of its potential environmental damage, partially under the guise of loving natural gas consumption as an alternative to dirtier coal consumption. (Shale gas has, for example, allowed the Midwest to retire many of its coal-fired power plants — see map below).



The electoral centrality of the Midwest may also be one reason the Democrats have refused to allow the Keystone XL pipeline to be constructed, because, by preventing Albertan heavy oil from reaching refineries on the US Gulf of Mexico coast by way of the Keystone pipeline, refineries in the Midwest were given a near-monopoly on Alberta’s oil exports, which really helped the refining industry (and to a lesser extent, people who drive a lot) in the Midwest. This is because the type of heavy oil produced in the Albertan tar sands deposits can only be refined at a certain refineries, of which there are very few outside of the Gulf of Mexico region or the Midwest. Indeed, after around 2009, Albertan oil in the Midwest (which tends to be measured by West Texas Intermediate or Western Canada Select prices – see graph below) began to cost significantly less than oil  in most other places in America or the world (as measured by Brent Crude prices).


It might be a bit cynical or conspiratorial to suggest (though others, like the former chief economist of the major Canadian bank CIBC, Jeff Rubin, have come very close to suggesting it), but it does seem possible that the Democrats’ blocking of Keystone by invoking environmental concerns was, at least in part, a political ploy intended to help them secure their influence in the Midwestern swing state region, while at the same time having the added benefit of denying financial profits to the Republican states and businesses on the Gulf coast, depriving the Republican-friendly Albertans of an even larger amount of profits, and channelling environmentalist ire toward Albertan tar sands production instead of toward Midwestern activities supported or tolerated by the Democrats, such as shale energy production, coal production, auto-manufacturing, suburban sprawl, and certain types of environmentally-intrusive farming.

Because this dynamic only emerged in recent years, as a result of the rise of Canadian tar sands oil production and the shale oil boom in North Dakota (which had by far the largest oil production growth of any US state, and which competes with oil from neighbouring Alberta and Saskatchewan for pipelines, trains, etc.), it may have contributed to the recent rising politicization of environmental protection.

10) Midwestern De-industrialization and Southern Industrialization 

In recent decades, the US manufacturing sector has become much smaller as a percentage of US GDP, and also much less labor-intensive. According to Business Insider magazine, the United States saw its manufacturing jobs decline by 32 percent during the 2000’s. Because many manufacturing industries are energy-intensive and resource-intensive, this means that there are fewer voters who have a very direct stake in environmentally damaging work. De-industrialization has also been something of a regional affair, occurring the most within Democrat or swing states in the Midwest/Great Lakes region, such as Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Among other things, these states produce cars and trucks (and components for cars and trucks), which, while still a very large cause of pollution in North America, have nevertheless become much more fuel-efficient than they used to be. Some Republican states in the South, in contrast, have actually been industrializing (and in particular, growing their auto-manufacuring) in recent years and decades.